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This paper studies the cyclical behavior of job separation and the characteristics of matches 
between workers and jobs. We estimate a proportional hazard model with competing risks, 
distinguishing between different types of separations. A higher unemployment rate at the 
start of an employment relationship increases the probability of job-to-job transitions, 
whereas its effect on employment-to-unemployment transitions is negative. We then 
build a simple job-ladder model to interpret our empirical results. A model with two-
dimensional heterogeneity in match (job) characteristics has the same qualitative features 
as the data. Once the model is calibrated to include cyclicality in the offered match 
characteristics, it can also fit the quantitative features of the data. The model reveals 
matches formed in booms provide more nonwage utility to the workers but are subject 
to a higher future probability of separation shocks.
© 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes how the characteristics of the match between jobs and workers vary over the business cycle. In a 
frictional labor market with heterogeneous workers and jobs, the match between workers and firms can differ from the first 
best. The degree of frictions in the labor market may vary over different phases of the business cycle. A natural question, 
therefore, is whether better matches are formed during booms than in recessions. We approach this question by analyzing 
workers’ job durations.
The main idea behind our study is that a better worker-firm match would last longer. If a worker has a better match 
with a particular firm than with another firm, he is more likely to feel better off working in the former firm, and thus he 
is less likely to leave that firm. To break such a match would require a large negative shock. Our approach is in the spirit 
of the revealed-preferences theory in that we infer the characteristics of a match from observed behavior. The advantage of 
our approach over the alternative approach of directly measuring productivity and wages from matched employer-employee 
data is that we can consider a broader concept of match quality that does not show up in output or wages, such as the 
attachment of a worker to a particular firm or the worker’s geographical preferences.1
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ismailb@smu.edu.sg (I. Baydur), tm1309@georgetown.edu (T. Mukoyama).
1 Many recent papers, including Nosal and Rupert (2007), Nunn (2013), Sullivan and To (2014), Jarosch (2015), Taber and Vejlin (2016), Hall and Mueller
(2018), and Sorkin (2018) emphasize the importance of considering non-wage characteristics in analyzing workers’ job choices.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2020.01.003
1094-2025/© 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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In the following, we first empirically study the effects of aggregate labor-market conditions on job duration using data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) 1979 cohort. We use the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model 
for job separations. A novel feature of our estimation is that we estimate the effects of the unemployment rate using a 
competing-risk structure in which an individual can experience different types of separations. We find the likelihood of a 
separation that leads the worker into a job-to-job transition (E E transition) and the likelihood of a separation that moves 
the worker into unemployment (EU transition) have strikingly different relationships to aggregate labor-market conditions 
at the formation of the match.2 A high unemployment rate at the start of a match increases the probability that it ends 
with an E E transition, but it has a negative effect on the probability that it ends with an EU transition. Our results are 
robust to several alternative specifications.
Our motivation for distinguishing between the types of job separation stems from the fact that different types of job 
separations are known to exhibit different cyclical properties. For example, the E E transition rate is known to be procyclical, 
whereas the EU transition rate is countercyclical, and thus the current unemployment rate is expected to have the opposite 
effect on job duration. These opposing forces can cancel each other out if the estimation does not distinguish between 
E E and EU transitions. In our setup, we can estimate both effects separately. As expected, an increase in the current 
unemployment rate (for a given unemployment rate at the start of the job spell) reduces the probability that the job spell 
ends with an E E transition, but it increases the probability that it ends with an EU transition.
We establish these results regarding the responses of E E and EU transitions to the unemployment rate after controlling 
for the starting wages. The pioneering work by Bowlus (1995) also studies the job duration over the business cycle but 
without distinguishing between different separation types. She shows the unemployment rate at the start of the job has 
a negative effect on job durations, but this effect disappears once the starting wages are controlled for. We obtain similar 
estimates but smaller in magnitude when we mix together all the separation types in our sample, as in Bowlus (1995).3
Bowlus’s (1995) interpretation of her result is that the cyclical movements in the match quality are internalized by wages. 
Our findings with different separation types draw a different conclusion. The opposite movements in E E and EU transitions 
over the business cycle can make overall separation rate close to acyclical. Analogously, our results suggest Bowlus’s (1995)
result reflects the opposite responses of E E and EU transitions to the unemployment rate at the start of a spell.
Using data from NLSY 1979, Mustre-del-Rio (2019) also studies job duration over the business cycle. Our paper method-
ologically differs from his paper in that he does not employ a competing risk structure. Instead, he estimates the hazard 
rates for certain transition types based on pre- and post-employment status and studies job duration for each transition 
type using their respective hazard-rate estimates. For example, he finds that a match formed during a boom lasts longer 
for jobs that are created from non-employment and ends with a transition to non-employment. Under a competing-risk 
structure, we are able to interact the hazard rates for different transition types and study overall job duration over the 
business cycle. Finally, using a matched employer-employee dataset, Kahn (2008) finds job spells are shorter when a match 
is formed during a recession. However, this relationship reverses after controlling for firm fixed effects.
The contrasting effect of aggregate conditions on different types of separations calls for a theoretical interpretation. To 
this end, we build a quantitative job-ladder model that features both endogenous separation and on-the-job search. We 
focus on the worker side of the problem, because our dataset contains information only on workers. (Thus, we use the 
terms “matches” and “jobs” interchangeably in the context of the model.) The model contains endogenous and exogenous 
separations: a match can break up either because the worker chooses to separate from a job (to move to another job or to 
unemployment) or because an exogenous shock moves a worker into unemployment. An employed worker can receive a job 
offer from another employer with some probability and decide whether to accept it. She may instead receive an exogenous-
separations shock, or may choose to move into unemployment. An unemployed worker can receive a job offer with some 
probability and decide whether to accept it. Matches (or, equivalently, jobs) are heterogeneous and the characteristics of 
matches are randomly drawn when job offers are generated.
We consider two-dimensional heterogeneity in match characteristics. The first is the (nonwage) utility from working at 
the particular firm; this type of heterogeneity is emphasized, for example, by Sorkin (2018). We call this component match 
quality. The second is the frequency of the exogenous job-destruction shocks. We call this component job stability (or match 
stability), and we consider two types of jobs for this dimension. This type of heterogeneity in jobs received attention in the 
recent literature; see Jarosch (2015) and Mukoyama (2019), for example.
We estimate the model-generated data in the same manner that we treat the NLSY data. In our baseline calibration, 
which assumes the job-offer distribution (in terms of the match quality and job stability) is acyclical, the Cox-estimation 
coefficients are of the same sign and of similar quantitative magnitude as the empirical counterparts except for one. We 
provide intuitions for the Cox coefficients by providing counterfactual experiments using the model.
To match the quantitative magnitudes of all coefficients in the Cox estimation, we allow for the cyclicality of job-offer 
distribution. We are able to match the empirical coefficients by assuming (i) the average of the offered match quality is 
better during booms and (ii) the matches (jobs) that are offered in recessions are more stable. With this specification, the 
matches that are formed during the booms are of higher quality but are less stable. In that sense, the answer to the question 
2 Although we also estimate the hazard rate for the transitions out of the labor force (E N transitions), some measurement issues are present in our 
dataset, and we mainly focus our discussion on comparing E E and EU transitions.
3 These two papers differ in several ways. For example, our sample includes a longer time period, and more importantly, we are able to include prime-
aged workers. The longer panel also allows us to address unobserved heterogeneity more effectively.
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“Are matches formed in booms better?” is quite subtle; they are better in the sense that they provide more nonwage utility 
to the workers, but they are worse in the sense that their future probability of exogenous separation is higher.
In the next section, we describe the dataset. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology, in particular, cause-specific 
and subhazard regressions. We present the estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 describes the model and the baseline 
calibration. The model results are shown in Section 6. Section 7 extends the model calibration to allow for cyclicality in the 
characteristics of offered jobs. Section 8 concludes.
2. Data description
We use data from the NLSY 1979 cohort in this study. A total of 12,686 individuals born between 1957 and 1964 
participated in this survey. These individuals were interviewed annually from 1979 through 1994 and biennially thereafter 
until 2014. The survey collected detailed information about each job a respondent currently holds or previously held.4 We 
use the Employer History Roster for employment histories for all the individuals participating in the survey. This roster 
includes exact start and stop dates for each job a respondent reported, and alleviates the more involved linking process 
across different survey years.
Our analysis is based on differentiating across job separations. The panel aspect of the data allows us to keep track of 
what happens after separating from the current employer, that is, whether the worker becomes non-employed or finds 
another job immediately. Based on this information, we distinguish employment-to-employment transitions, E E , as follows. 
When a worker loses his job but is able to find a new job within one month, we call this separation an E E transition.5 In 
a number of cases, the individual had another ongoing employment relationship when the job spell ended.6 We treat these 
job terminations also as E E transitions because the individual already had another job.
The job spells that are not an E E transition can either be a transition to unemployment, EU , or movement out of the 
labor force, E N . The distinction between the two types of separation might potentially impact our estimates because transi-
tions to unemployment and out of the labor force exhibit distinct cyclical behavior. Although transitions to unemployment 
are strongly countercyclical, transitions out of the labor force are weakly procyclical.7 Merging the two types of transitions 
would undermine the effect of aggregate labor-market conditions on transitions to unemployment.
To isolate EU transitions, we utilize the weekly array of employment status in NLSY 1979 database. Unfortunately, the 
survey did not collect the exact dates for job-search activity during the interviews. It only inquired about the total number 
of weeks spent actively searching for a job. If an individual was not unemployed for the entire spell of non-employment, 
the total number of weeks reported as unemployed is placed in the middle of the non-employment spell in the weekly 
array of employment status. Given this measurement error, we are only certain that an individual made a direct transition 
to unemployment if he is recorded as unemployed in the week immediately following the employment stop date. Our 
goal is to estimate the effect of aggregate labor-market conditions on transitions to unemployment. Therefore, we further 
distinguish these direct transitions to unemployment from those transitions potentially mixed with movements out of the 
labor force. More specifically, we label transitions to non-employment EU if the individual is recorded as unemployed in 
the week immediately following the last employment spell. We stress that the remaining transitions to non-employment, 
which we label E N , are a mixture of transitions to unemployment and out of the labor force. This procedure roughly equally 
divides the transitions to non-employment EU and E N .8
An exception to E E transitions is the case in which the separation was due to an obvious layoff or firing. We check the 
reason for separation for each job spell, and if it was one of the “firing” reasons we define below in Appendix C, we label 
this transition EU . The reason for this exception is that, by E E transition, we want to capture the behavior of a worker 
voluntarily moving to a new job, which is how we model the E E transition in Section 5. Furthermore, the individual makes 
a quick transition to employment in such cases and is likely to be attached to the labor force. Therefore, we label them an 
EU transition rather than an E N transition.
Our sample consists of multiple job spells for each individual. We measure the duration of a job spell in months. Some of 
the job spells are right censored due to the finite horizon of the survey and loss of follow-up. We include the unemployment 
rate at the start of the job, u0, to analyze the effect of aggregate labor-market conditions when the job was created. We 
also include the current unemployment rate, ut , as a time-varying regressor to capture on-going labor-market conditions. 
We obtain data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the national unemployment rate. We do not seasonally adjust 
the time series so that it is consistent with the data from NLSY.
4 Mustre-del-Rio (2019) discusses the advantages of NLSY over other surveys such as Current Population Survey (CPS), Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
5 This criterion is in line with the identification of E E transitions in the literature. Studies that use monthly CPS, such as Fallick and Fleischman (2004), 
rely on survey responses that are one month apart from each other. Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014), who use the SIPP dataset, define job-to-job transitions 
as those transitions in which the worker works in two consecutive months without reporting unemployment in between (in addition to the ones identified 
from the occupational switch).
6 These job spells correspond to 15% of all the job spells in our final sample.
7 See Fujita and Ramey (2006), Elsby et al. (2015), and Krusell et al. (2017), among others.
8 In some cases, the unemployment and out-of-labor-force status cannot be determined, or no information is available for the weeks following the job 
end dates. We excluded these spells from our final sample.
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We also control the hourly wage rate paid at the start of the job spell. Wages are reported as the usual wage earnings 
during the interview for all the jobs held by the respondent. This wage information is accompanied by a follow-up question 
about the frequency of payments, such as hourly, monthly, and annually. The NLSY 1979 database provides a calculated 
hourly wage rate using these variables along with the usual hours worked. This newly created variable is comparable across 
all the job spells. For most of the job spells, only one wage rate is recorded. When multiple hourly wages are recorded, for 
example, the job spell lasts more than a year, we use the first reported wage rate in our regressions. In what follows, we 
refer to this variable as the starting hourly wage rate.9
We also include industry and occupation controls in our regressions. In NLSY 1979, the industry and occupation coding 
schemes switch from Census 1970 to Census 2000 classification. To create comparable industry and occupation variables, 
we utilize the classification schemes from IPUMS-CPS that are based on Census 1990 industry and occupation codes. We 
further aggregate these variables using the broad industry and occupation categories in these classification schemes. We 
provide a detailed description of these broad categories in Appendix B.
The other explanatory variables include personal and job characteristics at the start of a job, such as age, race, education, 
and whether the job is protected by a union. Finally, NLSY has three subsamples representing the cross-section of the 
civilian population, a supplemental sample of disadvantaged groups, and a military sample. We use the sampling weights 
assigned to each individual in the first round of the survey to have a nationally representative sample.
3. Estimation strategy
The Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is widely applied to duration data when time to a failure event is of interest. 
In the analysis of job duration, the failure event of interest is job separation. Our analysis involves multiple types (“causes”) 
of job separations, and only the first of these causes for job separation, if any, is observed. In other words, each cause for job 
separation is a competing risk for the other causes. In this section, we start with a description of Cox’s proportional hazard 
model when the failure event has a single cause. Then, we describe two alternative approaches proposed in the literature 
when competing risks are present: cause-specific hazard regressions and regression on a subhazard function.10
3.1. Cox proportional hazard model
Let the hazard function for job separations be:
h(t) = lim
t→0
P (t ≤ T < t + t|T ≥ t)
t
.
The hazard function is the instantaneous probability that a job separation occurs at time t conditional on surviving up to 
time t . Cox (1972) further imposes that the hazard function for job separations, conditional on a set of explanatory variables 
at time t , takes the following proportional form:
h(t|X(t)) = h0(t)exp(X(t)β), (1)
where X(t) are time-varying explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters common across all job spells and all individ-
uals, and h0(t) is the baseline hazard. The baseline hazard is assumed to be the same across individuals, although it is left 
unspecified. Cox (1972) describes a semi-parametric approach for obtaining estimates of the model parameters, β̂ , through 










j:t j≥ti exp(X j(ti)β)
, (2)
where δi = 0 if the job spell is right-censored and δi = 1 if it is not. Note that right-censored job spells enter the partial 
likelihood function only through the denominator. Further, the baseline hazard can be recovered non-parametrically after 
obtaining β̂ even though it cancels from the estimating equation. The proportionality assumption implies the (log) hazard 
functions are strictly parallel and inference is possible solely based on β̂ . Specifically, a positive (negative) value of β̂ implies 
the probability of job separation increases (decreases) with an increase in the value of the explanatory variable.
3.2. Cause-specific hazard functions
A standard application of the Cox proportional hazard model can be misleading in the presence of competing events. 
The proportional hazard model in equation (1) assumes the explanatory variables affect the probability of job separation 
9 Bowlus (1995) also uses the starting wages in her regressions. Her justification for including the starting wage rather than the current wage in the 
hazard regressions is based on the fact that wages reported in later interviews are less responsive to the business cycles. Moreover, our data come from a 
longitudinal survey where interview dates are too infrequent to reflect wage earnings accurately for each month during the job spell.
10 Both methods have their pros and cons; see, for example, Putter et al. (2007) for a general discussion.
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in the same manner regardless of its cause. In this study, an E E transition and an EU transition are competing events for 
job separations. Hence, the starting and current unemployment rate may affect the probability of job separation in different 
directions for these two causes.
Taking this issue into account, here we define a separate hazard function for each cause-specific job separation. Formally, 
let k denote one of the K possible types of job separations. The hazard function for a job separation due to type k is:
hk(t|X(t)) = hk0(t)exp(X(t)βk). (3)
The specification in equation (3) is similar to the standard specification in equation (1) except that it is now separately 
defined for K different possible types of job separations. Both the baseline hazard functions and the parameters are allowed 
to differ across different types of job separations. The βk ’s can be estimated separately for each cause-specific hazard 
function by maximizing the partial likelihood function in equation (2). However, the occurrence of a competing event 
is treated as right-censored in each of these estimations. Although the estimation procedure with cause-specific hazard 
functions is the same as with the standard Cox proportional hazard model without competing risks, the interpretations of 
the parameter estimates are different. Because the distributions of time to a job separation for each cause-specific event are 
potentially dependent, the sign of the parameter estimates alone cannot determine the effect of a covariate on the duration 
of job. When the hazard functions are estimated separately for each cause-specific job separation, the effect of a change in 
the variable of interest on a cause-specific job separation depends nonlinearly on baseline hazard functions and parameter 
estimates of the other cause-specific hazard functions.















The survival probability now depends on the baseline and parameter estimates not only from the hazard regression of the 
event of interest, but also from the hazard regressions of the other competing events. Further, the probability of failing from 





The probability in equation (4) is called the cumulative incidence function. The cumulative incidence function represents the 
probability that failure from cause k occurs before time t . Because this function is an intuitively appealing object, below 
we measure the effect of a change in the starting and current unemployment rates on different types of separations by 
constructing cumulative incidence functions.
3.3. Regression on a subhazard function
As an alternative to cause-specific hazard regressions, Fine and Gray (1999) propose a methodology that allows inference 




P (t ≤ T < t + t|T ≥ t ∪ (T ≤ t ∩ K = k))
t
. (5)
The subhazard function shows the instantaneous probability of a job ending due to reason k conditional on surviving up to 
time t or ending before time t due to a reason other than k. Similarly to Cox’s proportional hazard model, Fine and Gray
(1999) assume the subhazard function takes the following form:
h̄k(t|X(t)) = h̄k0(t)exp(X(t)βk). (6)
The subhazard function in equation (6) can be estimated analogously to equation (2). The only difference in the estimation 
procedure is in the treatment of the risk set. According to equation (5), job spells that have already ended due to another 
cause are still considered to be in the risk set for the competing risk k. Because these observations can potentially become 
right-censored and dropped from the risk set (but the censoring cannot be observed, because job spells have already ended), 
Fine and Gray (1999) weight them using the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function for the censoring distribution.
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One of the advantages of the estimation strategy proposed by Fine and Gray (1999) is that inference can now be made 
based solely on β̂k , because the subhazard function is directly linked to the cumulative incidence function. Note the cumu-
lative incidence and subhazard functions for the competing risk k for an individual with X(t) are related as follows:









The estimates of βk have a similar interpretation to the standard Cox proportional hazard model. A positive (negative) value 
of β̂k implies increasing the value of the explanatory variable increases (decreases) the probability of job separation due to 
cause k.
Although the methodology in Fine and Grey (1999) facilitates inference for the covariate effects on a particular event 
of interest, the estimation procedure for a subhazard function is carried out independently of the subhazard functions for 
other competing risks. A drawback of this approach is that a joint distribution of competing events is not identified. If a 
researcher is interested in the effects of a covariate on some combination of the subhazard functions, these estimates can 
produce implausible results. For example, the survival function is equal to one minus the sum of the cumulative incidence 
functions over all the competing risks. The estimation procedure in Fine and Grey (1999) does not guarantee that this value 
is nonnegative over the entire domain of the covariate values. For large t , the predicted survival probability can be negative. 
Therefore, we use the cause-specific hazard estimates to produce cumulative incidence functions below because survival 
probabilities as well as cumulative incidence functions are between 0 and 1 by construction from equation (4).
3.4. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
If an individual-specific unobserved component exists, the job spells for the same individual are potentially correlated, 
and the estimates of βk are biased. To address the concerns about unobserved heterogeneity, we implement the most 
commonly used methods in the literature.11 First, we introduce a random frailty term to the hazard function, which is the 
same across all the job spells for that individual but differs from other individuals. We still assume the baseline hazard 
function and the coefficients are the same for all job spells. More specifically, the hazard rate due to cause k for job j of 
individual i takes the following form:






We define the subhazard function similarly. For both the cause-specific hazard and subhazard estimations, we assume 
the frailty terms for each job-termination reason, uik , are independent draws from their respective normal distributions with 
mean 0 and variances to be estimated from the data. This method is the counterpart of the random-effect estimation in a 
linear regression model. Despite the specific distributional assumption, this approach allows us to retain all the job spells in 
our sample.
The second method is based on stratification of the baseline hazard across individuals. This method is the counterpart 
of the fixed-effect estimation in a linear regression model. Under this specification, we restrict the baseline hazard function 
for each individual to be the same for all job spells, although the baseline hazards can differ across individuals. The hazard 
rate due to cause k for job j of individual i takes the following form:






The advantage of this method is that no distributional assumption is necessary. The risk sets are separately constructed 
for each individual and include only the job spells for that individual. The baseline hazard functions, hk0,i(t), can then be 
recovered non-parametrically for each individual. However, individuals with only one job spell do not contribute to the 
likelihood function. Thus, we remove those individuals from our sample.12 We also drop the individual characteristics that 
are constant over time, for example, indicators for high school and college degrees. These variables are not informative and 
simply cancel out from the likelihood under this specification.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Sample restrictions
Our sample covers all the survey years. Following Bowlus (1995), we restrict our sample to include only private-sector 
employment. Jobs that start before the individual completes all schooling or is younger than 16 years old are dropped from 
11 To address the concerns about unobserved heterogeneity, Bowlus (1995) randomly selects one job spell per individual. This procedure still produces 
unbiased estimates of βk . However, we would end up dropping about 80% of the observations from our sample if we used this method.
12 When we estimate the competing-risk models, some of the individuals may not have experienced a given type of event. Keeping these individuals in 
the sample does not affect the estimation procedures because their contribution to the corresponding likelihood function is nil.
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Table 1
Cause-specific hazard estimation under E E , EU , and E N classifications: these estimations use data from all the survey years available. SWAGE = natural 
logarithm of real starting wages; SQAGE = age squared; UNION = 1 if the job is covered under a union contract or collective bargaining agreement; 
HS = 1 if the respondent is a high-school graduate; COL = 1 if he completed 16 or more years of education; NWHITE = 1 if the respondent is black or 
Hispanic. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for industry and occupation variables are not reported. Significance of the variance 
of the frailty terms are based on a likelihood-ratio test comparing the model with and without frailty terms. For stratified regressions, standard errors are 
clustered over individuals. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Variable Normal frailty Stratified
E E EU E N E E EU E N
u0 .058*** −.057*** −.052*** .059*** −.053*** −.011
(.010) (.011) (.017) (.017) (.019) (.029)
ut −.110*** .122*** .038** −.122*** .108*** −.030
(.010) (.010) (.016) (.017) (.019) (.030)
SWAGE −.602*** −.434*** −.748*** −.972*** −.271*** −.689***
(.030) (.035) (.055) (.068) (.072) (.114)
AGE −.000 −.035*** −.080*** −.011 −.074*** −.194***
(.012) (.012) (.019) (.019) (.018) (.033)
SQAGE −.001*** .000 .001*** −.000 .001** .002***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
UNION −.304*** .107** −.112 −.133* .043 −.043
(.041) (.040) (.067) (.068) (.069) (.093)
HS .027 −.150*** −.331*** - -
(.038) (.040) (.057) - -
COL .356*** −0.420*** −.624*** - -
(.052) (.065) (.099) - -
NWHITE −.139*** .250*** .433*** - -
(.030) (.032) (.047) - -
Frailty (variance) .354*** .383*** .686*** - -
Occurrence: 8,063 6,657 3,100 7,913 6,542 2,991
# of job spells: 20,741 19,998
# of individuals: 4,331 3,588
# of right-censored: 2,921 2,552
the sample.13 Further, the sample does not include jobs with missing information and those lasting less than a month. 
We focus on full-time work and drop job spells with less than 35 weekly hours worked. We also exclude females from our 
sample because they are likely to quit for reasons other than poor match quality, such as marriage, pregnancy, and childcare.
We drop job spells that report wage earnings below the federal minimum wage rate at the start of the job spell. We then 
convert this variable to real starting hourly wage rate using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) series obtained from the BLS 
website. For a few observations, this procedure yields unrealistically high wage earning potentially due to a measurement 
error in the original data. Therefore, we dropped the job spells that report hourly real wage rates greater than 120 US 
dollars. These job spells correspond to less than 0.1% of the total number of job spells in our sample.
Our goal is to measure the effects of aggregate labor-market conditions on the civilian population. Thus, we drop the job 
spells from the military subsample. We also re-scale the sampling weights so that the average weight over all the jobs is 
equal to 1.
Our final sample consists of multiple job spells for each individual. We provide summary statistics for the explanatory 
variables in Appendix A.
4.2. Main results
Tables 1 and 2 present our main estimation results from cause-specific and subhazard regressions, respectively, using data 
from 1979 to 2014. The first three columns in Table 1 show the estimation results from the cause-specific hazard regressions 
with normally distributed frailty terms for E E , EU , and E N transitions. The last three columns show the results from the 
cause-specific regressions with stratification. Table 2 similarly shows our estimation results from subhazard regressions 
separately for normal frailty and stratified regressions.14 All the regressions control for the occupation and industry of the 
job, although their coefficient estimates are not presented. The coefficients of interest are those for the unemployment rate 
at the start of the job spell, u0, and the current unemployment rate, ut .15
13 We use the variable indicating monthly school-enrollment status to determine the final month of school enrollment.
14 The stratified subhazard estimation is not available in standard statistical packages. We extend our original sample by assigning the censoring probability 
as sampling weights to the job spells ending by a competing risk, and run a Cox regression to this extended sample. See Fine and Gray (1999) for details. 
For ut in the extended part of the data, we inserted the value observed in the last period of the job spell.
15 An alternative to using the unemployment rate at the start of the job spell is to use the unemployment rate at the start of the employment spell. 
We use the former because (i) we are interested in matches rather than employment states, and (ii) it is more straightforward for the comparison to the 
existing literature.
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Table 2
Subhazard estimation under E E , EU , and E N classifications: these estimations use data from all the survey years available. SWAGE = natural logarithm 
of real starting wages; SQAGE = age squared; UNION = 1 if the job is covered under a union contract or collective bargaining agreement; HS = 1 if the 
respondent is a high-school graduate; COL = 1 if he completed 16 or more years of education; NWHITE = 1 if the respondent is black or Hispanic. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for industry and occupation variables are not reported. Significance of the variance of the frailty terms 
are based on a likelihood-ratio test comparing the model with and without frailty terms. For stratified regressions, standard errors are clustered over 
individuals and corrected for KM weighting errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Variable Normal frailty Stratified
E E EU E N E E EU E N
u0 .134*** −.103*** −.064** .100*** −.075*** −.026
(.015) (.018) (.030) (.016) (.018) (.027)
ut −.222*** .169*** .032 −.186*** .150*** .002
(.018) (.018) (.031) (.017) (.017) (.029)
SWAGE −.251*** −.101** −.314*** −.653*** .160*** −.080
(.044) (.049) (.071) (.058) (.060) (.083)
AGE .042*** .007 −.041** .057*** −.021 −.100***
(.016) (.016) (.024) (.018) (.017) (.029)
SQAGE −.001*** −.000 .001** −.001*** .000 .001***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
UNION −.274*** .221*** −.043 −.173** .102** −.044
(.055) (.050) (.077) (.060) (.060) (.083)
HS .151** −.071 −.265*** - -
(.074) (.068) (.091) - -
COL .519*** −0.405*** −.610*** - -
(.102) (.107) (.153) - -
NWHITE −.236*** .225*** .404*** - -
(.039) (.040) (.058) - -
Frailty (variance) .256*** .272*** .517*** - -
Occurrence: 8,063 6,657 3,100 7,913 6,542 2,991
# of job spells: 20,741 19,998
# of individuals: 4,331 3,588
# of right-censored: 2,921 2,552
The effects of the explanatory variables can be directly inferred from the estimates of the subhazard regressions. Note, 
as discussed earlier, that although the coefficient estimates of the cause-specific regressions are not suitable for direct 
interpretations, the estimates from the subhazard regressions can be used for inferences. The effect of u0 is positive and 
statistically significant for E E transitions. The positive sign implies a high unemployment rate at the start of a job spell 
increases the probability that the worker moves from his current job to another job. By contrast, for the job separations 
that results in EU transitions, the sign of the coefficient for u0 is negative, which implies a high unemployment rate at the 
start of a job reduces the probability that the worker experiences EU transition in the future.
In the aggregate data, the cyclical behavior of the E E and EU flow rates are qualitatively different. Whereas the E E
flow rate is strongly procyclical, the EU flow rate is strongly countercyclical. This macro-level observation suggests they 
also respond to ut in opposite directions. The negative coefficient for ut from the subhazard regression for E E transitions 
indicates the probability that a job spell ends with an E E transition is lower during recessions. By contrast, the coefficient 
estimate from the subhazard regression for the EU transitions is positive and statistically significant. The positive coefficient 
implies the probability that a job spell ends with an EU transition is higher during a recession. Both of these estimates are 
consistent with the cyclical behavior of E E and EU flows. The effect of ut on E N transitions is similar to EU transitions, 
although the effects are smaller and insignificant. This result is as expected because transitions to unemployment and out 
of the labor force are mixed together in this group, and they move in opposite directions over the business cycle.
The results for the effect of ut are crucial for isolating the effect of u0, because the duration of a job spell is affected 
by the current cyclical fluctuations. Bowlus (1995) includes the unemployment rate as an explanatory variable for hazard 
regressions. However, the effects are ambiguous if ut has opposite effects on the decisions of workers and firms. In Bowlus
(1995), the coefficient estimate for ut is statistically insignificant when it is added linearly to the model. Bowlus (1995)
further adds the squared value of ut to the right-hand-side variables, and the estimates for the explanatory variables in-
volving ut are significant in her results. By distinguishing job separations according to their causes, we separately identify 
the effects of current cyclical fluctuations on the duration of a job spell ending with E E transitions and EU transitions. The 
opposite signs for different causes support the discussion about the effect of ut raised in Bowlus (1995).16
Although the estimates from the subhazard regressions provide a direct inference on the effects for u0 and ut on E E
transitions and EU transitions, using these estimates to make inferences about the overall duration of job can be mislead-
16 Bowlus’s (1995) motivation for including the current unemployment rate non-linearly in her analysis is to capture the countercyclicality of firings. 
Because we make a distinction across job spells according to transition type, we do not need to maintain this non-linearity assumption. Hence, we drop u2t
from our analysis.
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Fig. 1. Cumulative incidence functions for E E , EU and E N movements: the cumulative incidence functions are stacked so that the distance between two 
curves represents the probabilities of the different events. Shaded areas around each transition type represent 95% confidence intervals.
ing. The subhazard functions for different reasons of job separations are estimated separately, and the probability of job 
separation can potentially exceed 1 when the value of one of the explanatory variables is changed.
To evaluate the overall behavior of job durations, we use the coefficient estimates from the cause-specific hazard regres-
sions. Note the estimates of the coefficients from the cause-specific regressions alone are not informative about the effects 
of u0 and ut , although the signs agree with the estimates from the subhazard regressions. Note also that, under stratified 
estimation, we have a separate baseline hazard estimate for each individual in our sample. Therefore, we obtain the cu-
mulative incidence functions for each job-separation category, using the coefficient and baseline hazard estimates from the 
cause-specific hazard regressions with random frailty. By construction, the probability of job separation is less than 1 at any 
point in time.
Fig. 1 shows the cumulative incidence functions for each cause-specific job separations. The cumulative incidence func-
tions are drawn for a job in the manufacturing sector that is not protected by a union. This job is held by a 29-year-old 
high-school graduate white male production worker whose frailty term is equal to 0. His starting hourly wage is 5.68 in 
1982 US dollars, which corresponds to the average value for this profile in our sample. The unemployment rate is set equal 
to the average value of the unemployment rate for the survey years, 6.4%, and is assumed to be equal to this value for all 
of the time periods from the start of the job. The plots for all transition types are stacked so that the differences show the 
probability of observing the corresponding cause-specific job separation before time t . The shaded areas around the cumu-
lative incidence functions represent the 95% confidence intervals for each transition type.17 At any time t , the difference 
between the sum of cumulative incidence functions and 1 represents the survival probability. From the survival probability, 
we can calculate that the median duration of a job is around 21 months for this particular job.
Fig. 2 shows the effects of a change in u0 on the cumulative incidence functions for E E , EU , and E N transitions. In 
each plot, the solid curve shows the cumulative incidence functions when u0 is equal to its sample mean for the period 
under study, 6.4%. The dashed and dotted curves correspond to the cumulative incidence functions when u0 is one standard 
deviation, 1.62 percentage points, above or below its sample mean. The current unemployment rate is still kept at its sample 
mean for all of the remaining time periods.
Fig. 3 shows the change in the cumulative incidence functions for cause-specific job separations after a change in ut . 
In each plot, the solid curves show the cumulative incidence functions when ut is equal to 6.4%. The dashed and dotted 
curves correspond to the cumulative incidence functions when ut is permanently one standard deviation above or below its 
sample mean for all the periods after the job spell has started.
Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, the effect of u0 on the transition probabilities is quantitatively smaller than the effect of ut , 
but of a similar order of magnitude. The effect of aggregate economic conditions (here represented by ut ) on worker flows 
is well documented and extensively studied. These figures show the effect of u0 on worker flows is also quantitatively 
important.
17 Rosthøj et al. (2004) describe the procedure for calculating standard errors for cumulative incidence functions. We adapted their procedure to account 
for frailty terms present in our setup. See our online Appendix A for the details.
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Fig. 2. Changes in cumulative incidence functions in response to a change in u0. Shaded areas around each transition type represent 95% confidence 
intervals.
Fig. 3. Changes in cumulative incidence functions in response to a change in ut . Shaded areas around each transition type represent 95% confidence 
intervals.
4.3. Cox regression without competing risks
In this section, we pool all the separations together and run a standard Cox regression to highlight the importance of 
the competing-risks structure. This analysis is akin to Bowlus (1995) with the differences in the right-hand-side variables, 
the sample restrictions, and the methods used for controlling unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results are in Table 3. The first column shows our estimation results from the Cox regression under normal frailty 
with the same regressors in the main analysis. The second column adds the squared current unemployment rate, u2t , as in 
Bowlus (1995), and the third column drops the starting wages. Columns IV through VI repeat columns I through III, respec-
tively, under stratification over the individuals. Overall, neither u0 nor ut terms have a significant effect on job duration 
once wages are controlled for. These results have two important implications. First, columns II and III and columns V and 
VI echo the findings in Bowlus (1995): u0 has a positive effect on the separation hazard rate (although the magnitude is 
substantially smaller than hers), but this effect disappears once the starting wages are controlled for. Her interpretation of 
this result is that any cyclical fluctuation in match quality is internalized by the wage-bargaining process. However, under 
competing-risk structure, the starting unemployment rate has a significant effect on both E E and EU transitions even after 
controlling for the starting wage. One interpretation of this result is that non-pecuniary aspects of the jobs, not reflected in 
the starting wages, exist: this result further highlights the advantage of our approach over directly measuring productivity 
and wages from matched employer-employee data. Second, we know from macro-labor literature that the opposite cyclical 
patterns of E E and EU transitions largely cancel each other out. This observation is reflected as a zero coefficient in front 
of the current unemployment rate in column I of Table 3. We also find the unemployment rate at the start of the job spell 
has no effect once all separation types are mixed together. These findings suggest that pooling all the regression types to-
JID:YREDY AID:971 /FLA [m3G; v1.261; Prn:7/02/2020; 12:15] P.11 (1-21)
I. Baydur, T. Mukoyama / Review of Economic Dynamics ••• (••••) •••–••• 11
Table 3
Cox hazard estimation without competing risk: these estimations use data from all the survey years. SWAGE = natural logarithm of real starting wages; 
SQAGE = age squared; UNION = 1 if the job is covered under a union contract or collective bargaining agreement; HS = 1 if the respondent is a 
high-school graduate; COL = 1 if he completed 16 or more years of education; NWHITE = 1 if the respondent is black or Hispanic. Standard errors are 
given in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for industry and occupation variables are not reported. Significance of the variance of the frailty terms are based 
on a likelihood-ratio test comparing the model with and without frailty terms. For stratified regressions, standard errors are clustered over individuals. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Variable Normal frailty Stratified
I II III IV V VI
u0 .001 .001 .015** .009 .009 .026**
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.011) (.011) (.010)
ut .000 .000 .015 −.020* −.005 .020
(.006) (.037) (.037) (.011) (.056) (.055)
u2t - −.000 −.001 - .001 −.003
- (.003) (.003) - (.004) (.004)
SWAGE −.585*** −.585*** - −.665*** −.665*** -
(.022) (.064) - (.047) (.047) -
AGE −.034*** −.034*** −.039*** −.066*** −.066*** −.074***
(.008) (.092) (.008) (.129) (.013) (.013)
SQAGE .000 .000 .000 .001*** .001*** .001***
(.000) (.002) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
UNION −.106*** −.106*** −.228*** −.041 −.041 −.157***
(.027) (.055) (,026) (.044) (.044) (.043)
HS −.102*** −.103*** −.156*** - - -
(.026) (.055) (.026) - - -
COL −.032 −0.032 −.299*** - - -
(.039) (.124) (.038) - - -
NWHITE .076*** .076*** .151*** - - -
(.049) (.050) (.020) - - -
Frailty (variance) .264*** .264*** .255*** - - -
Occurrence: 17,820 8,306
# of individuals: 4,331 2,206
# of right-censored: 2,921 1,541
gether masks not only the cyclicality of the different types of separation rates, but also its dependence on the labor-market 
conditions on the onset of the job spell.
4.4. Robustness analysis
We performed several robustness checks to examine our main results. We discuss each of them briefly in this section. 
All the details about these regressions are deferred to our online Appendix B.18
NLSY data provide detailed information about the reason a job spell ended. This variable allows us to define an alternative 
classification for competing risks. In particular, we observe whether the job ended due to the worker’s quit decision or 
due to the firm’s decision, such as firing or plant closure. Using this piece of information, we define three categories for 
the reasons for job separations: quits, firings, and other reasons. At the macro level, it is well known that business-cycle 
properties of quits and firings are similar to E E and EU transitions, respectively. We investigate whether they are also 
similar with respect to their responses to the aggregate labor-market conditions at the start of the job spell. We find the 
results are very similar, with quits corresponding to E E transitions and firings corresponding to EU transitions.
The literature has documented that labor market dynamism, represented by various labor-market flow variables, has 
been declining in the US in recent years.19 These trends may have an impact on job duration. Hyatt and Spletzer (2016)
show the share of long-term jobs has been increasing in the US since around 2000. Although they show most of this trend 
can be explained by the aging population and other observables, time effects may be present that our analysis above does 
not capture. More specifically, because our sample comes from a cohort study, the age-related variables implicitly capture 
the time effects. To evaluate this point, we repeat our main analysis using a shorter panel by dropping the job spells that 
started before 1988, which also corresponds to the final survey year in Bowlus (1995). Overall, our main results for E E and 
EU transitions are robust to this restriction. One interesting finding is that the distinction between EU and E N transitions 
become clearer in our short panel regressions in that they respond to ut (and also u0) in opposite directions. Based on this 
result, we argue that the E N category in our short panel includes relatively more transitions out of labor force compared to 
our long panel, because the individuals are younger in the short panel and therefore are loosely attached to the labor force. 
Our results are broadly consistent with the findings in Fujita and Ramey (2006).
18 The URL address for the online Appendix is: https://sites .google .com /site /toshimukoyama /BM _online _appendix .pdf.
19 See Decker et al. (2014).
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In frailty regressions, we make two strong assumptions about the frailty terms: they are drawn independently from their 
respective normal distributions. Based on the results in Heckman and Honoré (1989), both the normality and independence 
assumptions can be relaxed. We do so by estimating the probability mass function defined over a discrete grid for the frailty 
terms along with other coefficients. Note that each grid point consists of one frailty term for each of the three competing 
risks. We find the estimated marginal distribution for each frailty is left skewed. We also find a positive correlation between 
the three frailty terms. In other words, individuals with short job spells tend to have high frailty terms for all types of 
separations. Nonetheless, the coefficient estimates for u0 and ut are similar to our findings in the main analysis.
We repeat our analysis above with the confidential geocode data from NLSY 1979. In this extension, we replace national 
unemployment rates with state-level unemployment rates and include the state-level unemployment insurance replacement 
ratio in the regressors. Our results are robust to this extension too, although u0 effects are somewhat smaller for E E and 
EU transitions.
In addition to industry fixed effects, we also explore whether the cyclical effects are concentrated in certain industries. 
To this aim, we broadly divide industries into two groups—goods-producing and service-providing industries—and include 
their interaction with u0 and ut in our regressions. We find the effect of u0 on EU transitions is negative for both industries, 
but it is much smaller for the goods-producing industries, and is sometimes insignificant, depending on the specification of 
the estimating model.
5. Model
In this section, we build a simple model to interpret the empirical results in Section 4. In particular, we consider the 
u0 and ut coefficients for E E and EU transitions in Table 1 as the baseline empirical result against which we compare the 
model outcome.
5.1. Setup
The model setup is a simple extension of the standard job-ladder model.20 An infinitely-lived worker is either employed 
or unemployed. We assume his utility is linear and he consumes what he receives each period.
The flow utility of an unemployed worker is assumed to be a constant b. The flow utility of an employed worker has an 
aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. The aggregate component, z, is stochastic and common across agents. It follows a 
Markov process F (z′|z), where ′ (prime) represents the next-period value. The idiosyncratic component, x, is match-specific. 
It is determined when the match is formed, and stays constant until separation. In sum, each employed worker receives 
z + x. The motivation for including the idiosyncratic component, x, is to capture the heterogeneity of matches (which affects 
both E E movement and EU movement) at the individual level. Given that the empirical patterns we focus on are still 
present even after controlling for wages, the idiosyncratic component x is best interpreted as nonwage job attributes, such 
as the amenity of the job. In what follows, we abstract from worker-specific (or job-specific) components in wages, such as 
the ones based on education, and assume that z is the common wage of employed workers. We call the nonwage component 
x as the match quality of a job.
Each match also has another dimension of heterogeneity. Matches can have a different likelihood of exogenous sepa-
ration.21 We call the separation likelihood the type of match and denote it by s ∈ {1, 2}. We assume that a type-2 match 
is more stable (has a smaller exogenous separation probability) than a type-1 match. Similar to the match quality, the 
match type is also determined when the match is formed, and stays constant until separation. In addition to the exogenous 
separation, the worker can separate from a job voluntarily.
For an employed worker, labor-market frictions are formulated as two stochastic events. First, he may receive a job offer 
from another employer that he can choose whether to accept. The probability of this shock is λe(z′) ∈ [0, 1]. Note this 
probability is a function of the next-period aggregate state z′ , reflecting the cyclicality of labor demand. The match quality 
and the type of this new job is randomly drawn at the time of the job offer. After seeing the match quality and the type, 
the worker chooses whether to stay in the same job, move to the new job, or move to unemployment. The second shock is 
an exogenous separation shock with probability δ(s, z′) ∈ [0, 1] that forces him to move to unemployment. As we described 
above, we assume δ(2, z′) ≤ δ(1, z′). We also assume λe(z′) + δ(s, z′) ≤ 1 for all s and z′ .
From these assumptions, an employed worker’s Bellman equation can be written as
W (s, x, z) =z + x + βEs′,x′,z′ [λe(z′)max{W (s′, x′, z′), W (s, x, z′), U (z′)}
+ (1 − λe(z′) − δ(s, z′))max{W (s, x, z′), U (z′)} + δ(s, z′)U (z′)].
Here, W (s, x, z) is the value function of an employed worker with type-s match with amenity x, U (z) is the value function 
of an unemployed worker, and β is the discount factor. The operator Es′,x′,z′ [·] takes the expected value with regard to s′ , 
x′ , and z′ . We assume that conditional on a job offer, a type-s job arrives with the probability ν(s).
20 Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) use a similar model in their analysis of the Great Recession.
21 This type of heterogeneity has received special attention in the recent literature. See Jarosch (2015), for example. Mukoyama (2019) analyzes a Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides-style model with endogenous job creation with such heterogeneity of jobs.
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An unemployed worker receives a job offer with probability λu(z′) ∈ [0, 1]. While unemployed, he receives a flow value 
of b, which can be interpreted as the combination of his unemployment-insurance benefit, home production, and the value 
of leisure. After observing the match quality of the offer, he chooses whether to take that job. An unemployed worker’s 
Bellman equation is therefore
U (z) = b + βEs′,x′,z′
[
λu(z
′)max{W (s′, x′, z′), U (z′)} + (1 − λu(z′))U (z′)
]
.
We assume that conditional on a job offer, a type-s job arrives with the probability ν(s).
5.2. Baseline calibration
One period is set as one month. The discount factor is set at β = 0.99 13 , as in Gertler and Trigari (2009). The stochastic 
process for z, F (z′|z), approximates an AR(1) process:
log(zt+1) = ρz log(zt) + εt,
where εt ∼ N(0, σ 2z ). We set ρz = 0.95
1
3 , again following Gertler and Trigari (2009). The standard deviation of z, σz , is set 
so that the quarterly value corresponds to 0.005, which is on the conservative side of the wage-cyclicality estimates in 
empirical studies. The approximation procedure by Chang and Kim (2006) yields σz = 0.005. Given that we compare the 
model results with the results in Table 1, where we control for the starting wages, we also repeat the exercises below 
without the fluctuations in z in Appendix D. The results are essentially the same.
We assume the match-quality process to follow a log-normal distribution with mean 0: log(x) ∼ N(0, σ 2x ). Given that we 
interpret x as a nonwage component of the utility from an individual job, it is not straightforward to tie σ 2x to observable 
statistics. For the wage component, Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) estimate the average wage gain upon job-to-job tran-
sition to be 3.3%. We assume the nonwage gain upon job-to-job transition is of similar magnitude as the wage gain, and 
target the average 3.3% gain in x upon job switching. This yields σx = 0.0395.
The types are drawn when a new job offer is made. We assume the probability of receiving the type-1 draw, denoted 
ν(1), is 0.5. Because we have only two types, type 1 and type 2, ν(2) is also 0.5. Following Hall and Milgrom (2008), we 
choose b so that the income the unemployed receives is 71% of the average value of z. Adding the mean value of x, we set 
b = 1.71.
The labor-market frictions, λu(z), λe(z), and δ(s, z), are calibrated using labor-market flows. First, we assume λe(z) is 
proportional to λu(z); λe(z) = αλu(z).22 Krusell et al. (2017) calculate the average job-to-job flow rate as 2.2% per month. 
We assume half of this movement is driven by the nonwage component, and thus target 1.1% job-to-job transition rate per 
month. This yields α = 0.19.
We assume λu(z) takes the following form:
λu(z) = λ̄u + φλ log(z).
The average value of λu , λ̄u , is set so that the gross flow from unemployment to employment in the steady-state model 
matches the corresponding value in the data. Krusell et al. (2017) calculate this flow rate to be 0.228 in monthly frequency.23
This target results in the parameter value λ̄u = 0.255. The parameter governing the fluctuations, φλ , is set so that the 
fluctuations of the corresponding flow rate in the model matches the data. The standard deviation of (quarterly averaged, 
logged, and HP-filtered with parameter value 1600) the flow rate from Krusell et al. (2017) is 0.088, and the model matches 
this number with φλ = 2.53.
The separation probability in the model takes the form
δ(s, z) = δ̄(s) − φδ log(z).
The average values for each type, δ̄(1), and δ̄(2), are set at 0.021 and 0.011. The aggregate gross flow rate from employment 
to unemployment is 0.014 per month, matching the empirical value from Krusell et al. (2017). In setting φδ , we target the 
standard deviation of the EU flow rate (quarterly averaged, logged, and HP-filtered with parameter value 1600), which is 
0.089. The resulting φδ is 0.123. Table 4 summarizes the calibration.
For the model computation, the Bellman equations are computed on discretized grids.24 The stochastic processes are 
approximated with Markov chains using Tauchen’s (1986) method. The value functions are computed by the standard value-
function iteration. Once the solution is found, we simulate the model to generate the data to be used in the next section.
22 Shimer (2005), Mukoyama (2014), and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) employ a similar assumption. This property comes out naturally from a search 
and matching model in which employed and unemployed workers compete for the same set of vacancies, but they differ in the efficiency of the search.
23 The time span Krusell et al. (2017) analyze is from 1978 to 2012, which is almost identical to our data period, although they use a different dataset 
(the Current Population Survey) from us.
24 We put 11 grid points in log(z) dimension and 51 grid points on log(x) dimension. The upper and lower bounds of the log(z) grid are set at plus and 
minus two standard deviations of the unconditional distribution of log(z). The upper and lower bounds of the log(x) grid are set at plus and minus five 
standard deviations of the log(x) draw.
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β Discount factor 0.99
1
3
b Value of unemployment 1.71
ρz Persistence of aggregate shocks 0.95
1
3
σz Dispersion of aggregate shocks 0.004
σx Dispersion of match quality 0.0395
α λe(z) relative to λu(z) 0.19
ν(1) Probability of type 1 job offer 0.5
λ̄u Average value of λu 0.255
δ̄(1) Average value of δ for type 1 0.021
δ̄(2) Average value of δ for type 2 0.011
φλ Fluctuation parameter of λu 2.53
φδ Fluctuation parameter of δ 0.123
Table 5
Cause-specific hazard estimation results.




In this section, we present the results for the baseline calibration. We find the model calibrated above can match the 
qualitative features of the separation hazards. We then run counterfactual experiments to investigate the mechanism that 
gives rise to the particular cyclical pattern of hazards.
6.1. Baseline results
The model implies the steady-state value of unemployment at 5.9%. The standard deviations of the employment and 
unemployment rate are 0.009 and 0.137. The corresponding empirical values are 0.010 and 0.117 in the data (Krusell et al., 
2017).25
To evaluate the implications of the model for different hazard rates, we run cause-specific Cox regressions to model-
generated data with u0 and ut as explanatory variables. We note a few practical points. First, we generate a long time 
series of the aggregate shock, z, and create monthly employment histories for a large number of individuals starting from 
the steady-state distribution. Owing to the large sample size, the regressions yield model-implied limits of the coefficient 
estimates with very small standard errors.26 Therefore, we do not report standard errors in the tables below. Second, the 
transition rates in the model contain no individual-level heterogeneity. Jobs with identical characteristics, that is, the same 
x, s, and z, face the same E E and EU hazard rates. Therefore, we run standard Cox regressions without any specification 
for unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, extension with Kaplan-Meier weighting makes the dataset for subhazard regressions 
extremely large. Due to its impracticality, we skip them in this section.
Table 5 describes the cause-specific Cox hazard regressions. The results are qualitatively consistent with the empirical 
results in Section 4.2, in particular, Table 1. The coefficients on u0 are positive for the jobs that end with E E transition, 
and negative for the jobs that end with EU . The ut coefficients are negative for E E and positive for EU . Quantitatively, 
all coefficients except for the u0 coefficient for EU sample are comparable to the ones in Table 1. We will revisit the 
quantitative fit in the next section.
6.2. Inspecting the mechanism
To investigate the background economic mechanism behind the results in Table 5, we run counterfactual experiments by 
allowing only one variable to fluctuate as in the baseline case. Four parameters fluctuate in the baseline calibration: z, λu , 
λe , and δ. Table 6 shows the results. The second to the fifth rows corresponds to the experiment that allows only one of the 
parameters to fluctuate. The first row repeats the baseline results for comparison. Our main focus is the coefficients on u0.
The positive coefficient on the jobs that end with E E is the most strongly influenced by the fluctuations of λe . The 
intuition is that, because a high λe in booms improves the distribution of x and s among the employed, the average values 
25 For all summary statistics here and below, the variables are quarterly averaged, logged, and HP-filtered with parameter value 1600.
26 To alleviate the impact of the initial distribution, we dropped the job spells within the first 1,000 periods. The resulting sample has more than half a 
million job spells.
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Table 6
Hazard estimation results: counterfactuals.
Experiment u0 coeff. for E E u0 coeff. for EU ut coeff. for E E ut coeff. for EU
Baseline .046 −.009 −.074 .105
z only −.028 −.033 −.015 .068
λu only .027 −.011 .046 .014
λe only .060 .004 −.059 .051
δ only .033 −.033 .020 .229
of x and s tend to be better in booms. The improved distribution in booms imply the matches formed via job-to-job 
transition during booms are better in terms of x and s than during recessions, because a new job has to be better than 
the current job for the worker to switch. Therefore, these jobs that are accepted during booms (with low u) are less likely 
to separate into even better matches (through E E transition) in the future—finding jobs that are even better is difficult. 
Through the E E transition, the composition of the current matches has an important influence on the characteristics of new 
matches.
The negative coefficient on the jobs that end with EU is most strongly affected by the fluctuations in z and δ. To see the 
intuition, first note that the matches that separates into unemployment tend to have very low x (and unstable s). A high 
z in booms implies that a worker accepts a job offer even when these jobs are not very attractive in terms of x and s. 
Thus, the jobs at the bottom tail of the x distribution and of the unstable type are accepted more in booms. In other words, 
the marginally accepted matches are worse in booms, and these tend to be separated more quickly. A similar logic works 
with δ. Because δ is low during booms, even jobs with the unstable type (in terms of s) are sufficiently attractive to be 
accepted. The role of δ is particularly important, because z can be interpreted as the wage factor, and the empirical patterns 
are robust to controlling for the starting wage.27
7. Cyclical job-offer distribution
One shortcoming of the baseline calibration is that the u0 coefficient for the jobs that separates into EU has a quantita-
tively small magnitude (in terms of absolute value). This section shows the model can be quantitatively consistent with the 
empirical results if the job-offer distribution changes over the business cycle.
We make two modifications to the assumptions on the job-offer distribution. First, the distribution of the match quality 
x is modified to log(x) ∼ N(μx, σ 2x ), allowing the average to be nonzero. In addition, we allow μx to depend on z in the 
form
μx(z) = φx log(z).
We calibrate z as in the baseline calibration. Our specification of μx here implies that the mean of log(x) is tied to the 
value of (the aggregate component of) the wage z. Note that here we introduce the fluctuations in μx to match the cyclical 
changes in the workers’ mobility decisions, and not the cyclical changes of the wage-offer distribution. The fluctuations in 
μx here capture the variation in the (unobserved) return to job offers that is not explained by the (observed) fluctuations in 
the aggregate component of the wages. From this viewpoint, although an alternative interpretation of x can be the sum of 
the idiosyncratic component of wages and idiosyncratic amenities, our identification here is still valid under this alternative 
interpretation, because here we do not attempt to directly match the cyclical changes in the wage-offer distribution. Second, 
we allow the fraction of type s, ν(s), to be cyclical. In particular, we assume the fraction of a new type-2 match takes the 
form
ν(2, z) = 0.5 + φν log(z).
We set the values of φx and φν so that both coefficients are quantitatively similar in magnitude to the empirical values 
in Table 1. The results are in the final row of Table 7.28 There, we set φx = 0.22 and φν = −7.90. These values imply that, 
on average, higher match-quality jobs are offered in booms, whereas more unstable jobs are offered at the same time.29
The second and third rows of Table 7 evaluate the effects of φx = 0.22 and φν = −7.90 separately. A procyclical μx
enhances the magnitude of the u0 coefficient on the jobs separated as E E . The reason is that the procyclical μx improves 
the distribution of x among existing matches. As we discuss in Section 6.2, this improvement in the distribution makes new 
job offers that are accepted during booms difficult to improve further. A countercyclical ν reduces the magnitude of the u0
coefficients on the jobs separated as E E and EU . This result is intuitive—because the matches formed in booms tend to be 
of the unstable type, they are likely to separate in future.
27 We repeat the exercises below without the fluctuations in z in Appendix D. There, indeed, δ is the single most important factor.
28 The rest of the parameters are set at the same value as in the baseline calibration. The results are essentially the same if we recalibrate φλ and φδ so 
that the standard deviations of the U E flow rate and the EU flow rate match the data values.
29 Note that, these correlations are about the offered jobs. As we see below, the correlations are the same for the accepted jobs.
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Table 7
Hazard estimation results: extended model.
Experiment u0 coeff. for E E u0 coeff. for EU ut coeff. for E E ut coeff. for EU
Baseline .046 −.009 −.074 .105
Cyclical μx .099 −.007 −.123 .096
Cyclical ν .004 −.053 −.052 .100
Both μx and ν .059 −.047 −.106 .097
Fig. 4. Scatter plots of average x against z, for all new matches, the matches from another job, and the matches from unemployment.
The result here presents a nuanced answer to the question, “Do matches formed in booms tend to be better?” The answer 
is yes and no—yes, in the sense that the match quality x tends to be better, and no, in the sense that the matches tend to 
be less stable in terms of s.30 The same relationship is true for the jobs that are actually accepted. Fig. 4 plots the values 
of average x among the new matches, from the model simulation. We also plot the averages for the matches from another 
job and matches from unemployment. The correlations are positive, showing the jobs that are newly accepted in booms 
are of higher quality, both for the workers that are from another job and for the workers that come from unemployment. 
Fig. 5 plots the simulated values of average s among the new matches. In contrast to Fig. 4, the correlations are negative, 
indicating that the jobs that are newly accepted in booms are less stable. Again, this correlation holds for both for the 
workers that are from another job and for the workers that come from unemployment.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically examined the effects of labor-market conditions on job duration. Using data from the NLSY 
1979 cohort, we estimated a proportional hazard model under the assumption that different causes of job separations are 
competing risks. Distinguishing between different types of separations is the main contribution of this paper because it 
allowed us to test separately for both of these opposing forces rather than estimating their net effect on the duration of job.
Two functions, the cause-specific hazard function and the subhazard function, have been widely used in the literature 
to estimate hazard models in the presence of competing risks. We applied both functions in this paper, and they produced 
results that are consistent with each other. We found that an increase in the unemployment rate at the start of an employ-
ment relation increases the probability that a separation with job-to-job transition occurs, but it reduces the probability 
that it ends with the worker moving into unemployment. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.
30 In many macroeconomic contexts, whether the matches formed in booms are better has important aggregate consequences. For example, the models by 
Moscarini (2001) and Barlevy (2002) feature procyclical match quality, and this result has important implications on the aggregate labor-market outcome. 
These models consider on-the-job search and share some features with our job-ladder model, although our model is substantially simpler (and our model 
has an additional dimension of heterogeneity in job stability). In Costain and Reiter (2008), this relationship between match quality and business cycles 
plays an important role in explaining labor-market volatility.
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Fig. 5. Scatter plots of average s against z, for all new matches, the matches from another job, and the matches from unemployment.
To interpret the empirical findings, we constructed a simple job-ladder model with two-dimensional job characteristics. 
We assume matches are different in match quality (i.e., nonwage utility that a job provides to the worker) and stability (i.e., 
the probability of exogenous separation in the future). Our model is qualitatively in line with the empirical results from 
the US data. We ran counterfactual experiments to investigate the mechanism behind the correlations between the initial 
labor-market condition and subsequent separations. We found the job-to-job transition plays an important role in generating 
the relationship between the initial labor-market condition and the separations due to job-to-job transitions. In booms, the 
existing jobs are already well matched, and the jobs that are created by job-to-job transitions also have to be good matches. 
For the jobs that separate into unemployment, the behavior of the marginally accepted matches is important.
By allowing the characteristics of the offered jobs to be cyclical, we were able to fit the model to the data quantitatively. 
The important properties are that the jobs that are offered (and accepted) in booms tend to have high match quality but 
low stability. Examining the cause of the cyclicality of the offered job characteristics is an important future research topic.
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Appendix A. Details of data construction and summary statistics
We use the Employer History Roster provided by the NLSY 1979. This roster contains information on up to 65 jobs every 
individual holds. We retrieved the job start and end dates, the employment status, and the reason for job separation directly 
from this roster. Class of worker, union status, industry and occupation, usual wage, and hours are spread out across a roster 
created separately for each survey year. We create these variables by linking the rosters for each survey year. We use the 
job start and end dates to calculate the duration of the job and the information on the employment status to determine the 
censored observations.
Starting from 1980, each survey asked respondents about their school enrollment for each month from the date of the 
last interview until the date of the current interview. We use this information to determine the last month a respondent 
was enrolled in school. For those respondents who did not attend school after 1980, we use the information in the first 
survey in 1979 about the last date a respondent attended school. If the year of the last school enrollment is missing, we 
drop this individual from our sample. If only the month of the last school enrollment is missing, we insert May as the 
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Table 8
Description and means for our samples: these samples are used in the competing-risk regressions in the main 
analysis with frailty specification.
Variable Explanation Mean
Job spells
u0 Unemployment rate at the start of the job 6.497
SWAGE (log) Real hourly starting wage 1.848
AGE Age of the respondent at the start of the job 29.889
UNION = 1 if covered by union 0.120
Individuals
HS = 1 if obtained high school diploma or equivalent 0.658
COL = 1 if completed 16 years of schooling 0.175
NWHITE = 1 if black or Hispanic 0.432
# of job spells: 20,741
# of right-censored: 2,921
Median duration: 14 months
# of individuals: 4,331
graduation month, which is the modal month in our sample. For our main analysis, we drop job spells that start before all 
schooling is completed.
To determine E E , EU , and E N transitions for a job spell, we compare the stop date of that job spell with the start 
date of other job spells. If the difference between the stop and the start dates is less than 30 days and the job did not 
end with a firing, we label this job E E . In some cases, multiple jobs overlap. We labeled these cases E E if the respondent 
already had another job at the time the job ended. For the remaining jobs, we check the employment status in the week 
immediately following the job end date from the weekly status array. We classify the job as EU if the respondent is recorded 
as unemployed. We labeled all the other job spells E N .
The sample does not include jobs lasting less than a month. We focus on full-time work in the private sector and drop 
the job spells with less than 35 weekly hours worked or reported as self-employed or in the public sector. We exclude 
females from our sample because they are likely to quit for reasons other than poor match quality, such as marriage, 
pregnancy, and childcare. We also focus on the civilian population and drop individuals in the military subsample. For every 
regression, sampling weights are scaled so that the average weight of the job spells is equal to 1. Finally, we define the first 
reported hourly wage as the starting hourly wage and drop the job spell if this value is below the federal minimum wage 
in the month the job spell started. We use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) series to convert this variable to real starting 
hourly wage. In a few cases, the calculated wage rate was astronomically high, for example, 24, 000 US dollars per hour. To 
address the potential measurement errors, we dropped the job spells that paid wages more than 120 US dollars.
Table 8 shows summary statistics from our sample used in the competing-risk regressions with frailty specification af-
ter imposing these restrictions above. We note the median job duration is 14 months in our final sample. Another data 
source for job duration in the US is the Longitudinal Employer-Household Database (LEHD), which is a matched employer-
employee dataset covering 98% of all the jobs in the US. Using this dataset, Hyatt and Spletzer (2017) study the behavior of 
single-quarter jobs, which they define as jobs lasting less than three months. They find the incidence of the single-quarter 
jobs was 8.3% in 1998. The corresponding number in our sample is 9.9%. Although the job durations are slightly shorter 
in our sample, we note several differences between their measure and ours. First, our calculations include right-censored 
job spells that potentially last longer but are lost due to follow-up. Because LEHD is constructed from administrative data, 
sample attrition is not an issue. Second, our sample consists primarily of job spells that started when the individuals were 
relatively young. Hyatt and Spletzer (2017) further report the incidence of single-quarter jobs declines with age except for 
those around retirement age. Finally, our sample excludes women who tend to have longer job spells according to the same 
study.
For a better comparison, we include the job spells from women in our sample and calculate the incidence of single-
quarter jobs for each age group. To match their age categories, we also add job spells from younger ages. Our results are 
presented in Table 9. To address the right-censoring issue in our sample, we calculate two measures. The first measure, 
shown in the first column, counts only the jobs that are completed within three months as single-quarter jobs. This number 
yields the lower bound for the incidence of single-quarter jobs. The second measure, shown in the second column, adds 
to this measure the job spells that are right-censored within the first three months. Because some of these job spells po-
tentially lasted more than three months, this measure gives the upper bound for the incidence of single quarter jobs. The 
last column is copied from Table 1a in Hyatt and Spletzer (2017), which is based on the data from LEHD between 1996 
and 2012.31 With these modifications, our calculations accord with theirs quite well with one exception. From age 35 and 
onward, our sample has systematically longer job spells. The discrepancy might stem from the fact that the incidence of 
31 We exclude the last age category because our sample does not have any job spell recorded after age 65.
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Table 9
Comparison of our sample to LEHD: this table shows the incidence of single-quarter 
jobs (in percentages) from our sample and Hyatt and Spletzer (2017).
Age groups Lower bound Upper bound LEHD
14-18 13.3 26.0 15.4
19-21 11.1 16.3 13.1
22-24 8.4 12.2 9.8
25-34 7.4 9.1 7.1
35-44 4.0 5.3 5.5
45-54 2.4 3.1 4.4
54-64 0.4 1.2 4.0
Table 10
Occupation and industry classifications: these classifications are based on OCC1990 
and IND1990 variables from the IPUMS-CPS database, respectively. The second col-
umn indicates the number of observations in each category in our final sample.
Category Observations
Occupation classes
Managerial and professional 2,473
Technical, sales, and administrative 2,692
Service 2,397
Farming, forestry, and fishing 787
Precision production, craft, and repairers 4,769
Operatives and laborers 7,623
Industry classes




Transportation, communication, and other public utilities 1,852
Wholesale trade 887
Retail trade 3,459
Finance, insurance, and real estate 716
Business and repair services 2,233
Personal services 504
Entertainment and recreation services 292
Professional and related services 1,193
Public administration 41
single-quarter jobs falls steadily starting around 2000. This date roughly corresponds to the job spells when the individuals 
in our sample are 36 years old and over.
The expected job duration for the median individual is around 26 months. This number is naturally greater than the me-
dian job duration, because individuals who change jobs frequently have shorter job spells and contributes disproportionately 
more observations to our sample.
Appendix B. Occupation and industry classification
We use OCC1990 and IND1990 variables available at the IPUMS-CPS database to have a comparable occupation and 
industry classifications throughout our analysis. We further group these occupation and industry codes into the broad cat-
egories presented in Table 10. Our occupation and industry dummy variables are based on these categories. The second 
column indicates the number of observations in our final sample.
Appendix C. List of job-separation reasons
Employer History Roster in the NLSY 1979 provides the following reasons for job separations. These job categories are not 
consistently available in all the survey years. We indicate their availability below. We categorize these reasons as [Q]-quit, 
[F]-firing, and [O]-other reasons. We re-label the E E transitions as EU if they ended due to one of these reasons in the 
firing category. We use these categories in the online Appendix, where we repeat our analysis with competing risks defined 
by reason.32
32 Note that some of the categories are labeled either as quit or other reasons. Our main quit category in the analysis in the online Appendix is quit to 
take another job, but this category is available only after 1990. For the other quit categories, we require the individual to have had a job lined up to be 
classified in the quit category. Otherwise, we classify this spell under the other reasons category. We also exclude reasons 27 through 30 because they are 
related to self-employment.
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Table 11
Hazard estimation results.
Variable E E EU
u0 .057 −.007
ut −.083 .092
1. Layoff, plant closed, or end of temporary or seasonal job [F]: 1983 and before.
2. Layoff, job eliminated [F]: 2002 and onwards.
3. Layoff [F]: 1984 and onwards.
4. Plant closed [F]: 1984 and onwards.
5. Company, office or workplace closed [F]: 2002 and onwards.
6. End of temporary or seasonal job [F]: 1984 and onwards.
7. Discharged or fired [F]: All survey years.
8. Program ended [O]: All survey years.
9. Government program ended [O]: 2002 and onwards.
10. Project completed or job ended [O]: only in 2012.
11. Pregnancy [Q/O]: only in 1979.
12. Family reasons (to get married, to care for children, illness of other family members) [Q/O]: only in 1979.
13. Quit for pregnancy or family reasons [Q/O]: from 1980 to 2000.
14. Quit for pregnancy, childbirth or adoption of a child [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
15. Quit to spend time with or take care of children, spouse, parents, or other family members [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
16. Quit because found a better job [Q]: only in 1979.
17. Quit to take another job [Q]: 1990 and onwards.
18. Quit to look for another job [O]: 1990 and onwards.
19. Quit because interfered with school [Q/O]: only in 1979.
20. Quit to attend school or training [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
21. Quit to enter armed forces [Q/O]: only in 1979.
22. Quit because respondent’s ill health, disability, or medical problems [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
23. Quit because wages too low [Q/O]: only in 1979.
24. Quit because of employment conditions (didn’t like work, hours, conditions, or location, etc.) [Q/O]: only in 1979.
25. Quit because didn’t like job, boss, coworkers, pay or benefits [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
26. Quit for other reasons [Q/O]: 1980 and onwards.
27. Business failed or bankruptcy [-]: 2002 and onwards.
28. Sold business to another person or firm [-]: 2002 and onwards.
29. Closed business down or dissolved partnership [-]: 2002 and onwards.
30. Business temporarily inactive [-]: 2002 and onwards.
31. Moved to another geographic area [Q/O] 2002 and onwards.
32. Job assigned through a temp agency or a contract firm became permanent [Q/O]: 2002 and onwards.
33. Dissatisfied with job matching service [Q/O] 2002 and onwards.
34. No desirable assignments available [Q/O] 2002 and onwards.
35. Husband or wife changed jobs and/or moved [Q/O] only in 1979.
36. Mother or father changed jobs and/or moved [Q/O] only in 1979.
37. Transportation problems [Q/O] 2002 and onwards.
38. Went to jail, prison, had legal problems [O]: 2002 and onwards.
39. Retired [O]: 2002 and onwards.
40. Other (specify) [Q/O]: all the survey years.
Appendix D. No fluctuations in z
Here, we repeat the exercises of Sections 6 and 7 while keeping z constant over time. In this specification, the wage is 
constant at 1 for everyone.
First, φλ and φδ are recalibrated in the baseline model so that the standard deviations of the U E flow rate and EU flow 
rate match the data. Note that log(z) that is multiplied to φλ and φδ is now a latent variable.
Table 11 repeats Table 5 in the main text. The results are essentially the same; all coefficients are qualitatively in the 
same sign as in the data, and the u0 coefficient for the jobs that experience EU transitions is one order of magnitude 
smaller.
Table 12 conducts the same decomposition (except for the “z only” case) as Table 6. The intuition is the same, except 
that now z plays no role by construction. The fluctuations in λe play an important role in the u0 coefficient for the jobs 
that end with E E transition, and δ fluctuations play the most important role in generating the negative u0 coefficient for 
the jobs that transition into EU .
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Table 12
Hazard estimation results: counterfactuals.
Experiment u0 coeff. for E E u0 coeff. for EU ut coeff. for E E ut coeff. for EU
Baseline .057 −.007 −.083 .092
λu only .029 −.011 .041 .007
λe only .077 .005 −.060 .061
δ only .028 −.032 .024 .220
Table 13
Hazard estimation results: extended model.
Experiment u0 coeff. for E E u0 coeff. for EU ut coeff. for E E ut coeff. for EU
Baseline .057 −.007 −.083 .092
Cyclical μx .105 −.004 −.121 .090
Cyclical ν .011 −.051 −.057 .097
Both μx and ν .066 −.044 −.108 .093
Table 13 evaluates the effects of φx = 0.22 and φν = −7.90, as in Table 7 in the main text. As in the baseline case, we 
find that when μx and ν are cyclical, the model coefficients on u0 and ut can quantitatively match their data counterparts.
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